Every major publication in Washington, London, and Tel Aviv wants to sell you the exact same bedtime story. The plot is simple. For decades, Israel was a pristine, functioning liberal democracy with balanced checks and balances, until one Machiavellian prime minister arrived, systematically dismantled the judiciary, corrupted the civil service, and bent the state to his personal will.
That narrative is comforting. It is also factually lazy. You might also find this connected article insightful: Why Republicans Are Betting Everything on Transgender Issues in the Final Stretch.
If you spend any real time inside the machinery of Israeli governance, watching how bills actually die in committee or how legal advisors exercise veto power over elected cabinet ministers, you realize the standard media consensus has the causality entirely backward. Benjamin Netanyahu did not destroy a balanced constitutional system. He exploited a structural vacuum that Israel’s founders deliberately left unbuilt in 1948, and he weaponized a counter-reaction to an aggressive judicial revolution that began long before he ever held the prime minister’s office.
To understand what actually happened to Israel’s institutions, you have to stop treating politics like a morality play and start looking at constitutional architecture. As extensively documented in detailed articles by Reuters, the effects are significant.
The Myth of the Broken Constitution
You cannot break a constitution that does not exist.
When David Ben-Gurion and the founding generation established the State of Israel, they punted on writing a formal constitution. They faced irreconcilable ideological divides between secular socialists and religious traditionalists, alongside an existential war. Instead of ratifying a supreme law that defined the exact boundaries between the Knesset, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court, they passed the Harari Decision in 1950. The plan was to write a constitution piecemeal through a series of "Basic Laws."
For forty years, Israel operated under a system of near-total parliamentary supremacy, modeled roughly on the British Westminster system, but without Britain's centuries of ingrained constitutional convention. There was no upper house of parliament. There was no presidential veto. There were no regional electoral districts to tether lawmakers to local voters. Whoever controlled a 61-seat coalition in the 120-seat Knesset controlled both the legislature and the executive branch simultaneously.
Then came the 1990s, and with it, Chief Justice Aharon Barak.
In 1992, the Knesset passed two new Basic Laws: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Freedom of Occupation. Notably, neither law explicitly granted the Supreme Court the power to strike down primary legislation passed by the parliament. In 1995, in the landmark United Mizrahi Bank ruling, Barak declared that those two laws constituted a "constitutional revolution." Overnight, the Supreme Court claimed the authority of judicial review, asserting the right to invalidate Knesset legislation and expand the doctrine of "unreasonableness"—a subjective legal standard allowing judges to overturn government decisions not because they were illegal, but because the court deemed them insufficiently reasonable.
When commentators claim Netanyahu assaulted Israel’s institutional balance, they conveniently start the clock in 2009 or 2023. They ignore that the institutional balance had already been violently upended in 1995 without a national referendum or a constitutional assembly. Netanyahu did not invent the institutional war; he merely recognized that the right-wing electoral majority was structurally locked out of governing by unelected gatekeepers, and he decided to fight back using the exact same brute-force institutional tools his opponents had pioneered.
How the Gatekeepers Actually Governed
To grasp why the 2023 judicial overhaul triggered a national nervous breakdown, you have to look at two uniquely Israeli institutional anomalies that Western journalists almost always mischaracterize: the Judicial Selection Committee and the office of the Attorney General.
In the United States, elected politicians appoint judges. The President nominates them; the Senate confirms them. In Germany, a parliamentary committee elects constitutional judges by a two-thirds majority. In Israel, judges sit on the nine-member committee that selects their own successors. Three Supreme Court justices and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association hold five of the nine seats. Together, the legal establishment holds a built-in majority. Sitting justices literally choose who gets to join their club, creating a self-perpetuating ideological echo chamber.
Even more powerful is the Israeli Attorney General. Unlike the U.S. Attorney General, who is a political appointee serving at the pleasure of the President, Israel’s Attorney General is an independent civil servant whose legal opinions are binding on the government. If the Prime Minister wants to pursue a policy and the Attorney General says no, the government cannot even hire private counsel to argue its case in court without the Attorney General's explicit permission.
I have watched senior Israeli ministry officials spend six months drafting economic deregulation policies, only to have a mid-level deputy legal advisor kill the entire initiative in a ten-minute meeting—not because it violated a statute, but because it failed an amorphous standard of administrative "reasonableness." When elected officials have zero authority to hire their own lawyers or overrule bureaucratic legal opinions, democracy becomes ceremonial.
Netanyahu saw this dynamic clearly. Instead of pursuing boring, incremental constitutional reform—which would have required compromising with the center-left to pass a formal Basic Law on Legislation—he chose political warfare. He framed the legal establishment not as flawed institutions in need of structural recalibration, but as a "deep state" cabal conspiring to depose him.
The Weaponization of Institutional Decay
Here is where the contrarian view cuts both ways. Acknowledging that Israel’s judiciary overreached does not absolve Netanyahu. In fact, it exposes his deeper institutional failure.
A true conservative reformer would have looked at Israel’s broken system and built durable guardrails: a formal constitution, a two-house legislature, regional representation, and a clear, narrow definition of judicial review. Netanyahu did none of those things. Why? Because durable institutions limit the power of all executives—including him.
Netanyahu’s actual institutional strategy was not to fix the state, but to hollow out every center of power that could rival his personal authority. Look at the pattern across two decades:
- The Cabinet and Ministries: He systematically fragmented government ministries to hand out coalition favors, creating bloated, overlapping bureaucracies—like splitting water, energy, and environmental authorities across multiple ministers—so no single cabinet member could build an independent power base.
- The Party Apparatus: He transformed the Likud from a vibrant ideological movement with heavyweight princes like Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, and Reuven Rivlin into a personality cult where loyalty to the leader became the sole metric for advancement on the party list.
- The Budgetary Process: For years, he bypassed normal multi-year fiscal planning, relying on provisional budgets and last-minute coalition funds to keep narrow sectarian partners—specifically the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties—permanently dependent on his political survival.
- The Security-Political Divide: He perfected the art of outsourcing strategic responsibility to the IDF and intelligence chiefs when policies failed, while hoarding political credit when deterrence held. That institutional rot reached its catastrophic nadir on October 7, 2023, when a prime minister who had spent years eroding cabinet deliberation and national security council authority faced the worst intelligence and operational collapse in the nation's history.
The media calls this "authoritarianism." That is the wrong word. Authoritarians build massive, centralized, hyper-efficient state apparatuses to enforce their will. Netanyahu presided over institutional entropy. He weakened the civil service, sidelined the foreign ministry, paralyzed the Knesset's oversight committees, and allowed coalition partners to treat state budgets like private ATMs. He did not build a dictatorship; he engineered a state of permanent managed chaos where he remained the indispensable broker.
Dismantling the Lazy Consensus
If you look up what people actually search when trying to make sense of this mess, the questions themselves reveal how badly the public has been misled.
Did Netanyahu destroy Israel's checks and balances?
No, because Israel never had a system of checks and balances in the American sense. It had a system of unchecked parliamentary power that was suddenly countered in the 1990s by unchecked judicial power. Netanyahu didn't break a working machine; he crashed two incompatible institutional models into each other at high speed.
Why didn't the Israeli military or civil service stop the 2023 judicial overhaul?
Because in a system without a written constitution, the boundary between lawful dissent and institutional mutiny is dangerously blurry. When military reservists threatened to stop reporting for duty over legislation passed by a democratically elected Knesset, they weren't saving democracy—they were introducing a military veto over civilian governance. Netanyahu’s recklessness provoked a counter-reaction that damaged the IDF's apolitical ethos just as severely as his legislation threatened the courts.
Would removing Netanyahu fix Israel's institutional crisis?
This is the biggest delusion of the anti-Netanyahu camp. Remove him tomorrow, and you still have a country with no constitution, an electoral threshold that empowers extremist kingmakers, a Supreme Court that operates without defined jurisdictional limits, and a massive demographic divide over military service and state funding. Replacing the driver does not fix a car with no brakes and two steering wheels.
The Cost of Structural Denial
Let’s be brutally honest about the downside of dismantling the standard anti-Netanyahu narrative: when you point out that the Israeli Supreme Court and legal bureaucracy overstepped their democratic mandate, bad-faith actors immediately use your argument to justify smashing the courts entirely without replacing them with real constitutional limits.
That is precisely what happened in 2023. Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Knesset Constitution Committee Chairman Simcha Rothman took a legitimate critique of judicial overreach and used it as a battering ram to propose a system where a bare 61-seat majority could override any court ruling, appoint its own judges, and effectively place the executive branch above the law. They took a surgical problem and reached for a chainsaw.
Meanwhile, the opposition wrapped itself in the flag of "defending democracy" while refusing to admit that the status quo ante was deeply undemocratic. By defending an uncodified system where unelected legal advisors could veto elected governments, they alienated millions of working-class, Mizrahi, and traditional voters who legitimately felt the Supreme Court functioned as the political arm of an Ashkenazi secular elite.
Both sides weaponized institutional dysfunction for tribal gain.
What Real Institutional Repair Actually Looks Like
If Israel ever wants to escape this endless cycle of constitutional crisis, it has to abandon both Netanyahu’s destructive populism and the legal establishment’s paternalistic gatekeeping. Tweaking the Judicial Selection Committee or passing another ad-hoc Basic Law will solve nothing.
Real structural reform requires four non-negotiable moves:
- Ratify a Rigid Basic Law on Legislation: Define, in black and white, how a Basic Law is passed. Require a supermajority—at least 70 or 80 votes in the Knesset, plus a public referendum—to enact or amend constitutional-level laws. Stop letting narrow 61-seat coalitions rewrite the rules of the game at three in the morning to survive a budget vote.
- Codify and Limit Judicial Review: Explicitly grant the Supreme Court the right to strike down unconstitutional laws, while simultaneously abolishing the subjective "reasonableness" standard for elected cabinet ministers. Judges should rule on legality, not policy preferences.
- Raise the Electoral Threshold and Introduce Regional Representation: Force political consolidation by raising the Knesset threshold from 3.25% to 5%, and elect at least half the parliament from regional districts. Until lawmakers answer to specific geographic constituencies rather than a single party boss, the Knesset will remain a rubber stamp for the Prime Minister.
- Separate the Attorney General's Roles: Split the office in two. Create an independent Prosecutor General to handle criminal indictments without political interference, and a separate Legal Counsel to the Government who advises the cabinet rather than dictating binding vetoes.
Benjamin Netanyahu did not invent Israel's institutional crisis. He was the ultimate symptom of it—a master political operator who looked at a state built on improvised compromises, realized nobody had written down the rules, and decided to play the game to the absolute limit. Until Israelis sit down and finally write the constitution their founders postponed in 1948, another Netanyahu will always be waiting in the wings.