How Arab Parties Became Israel's Unlikely Kingmakers When Netanyahu Fell Short

How Arab Parties Became Israel's Unlikely Kingmakers When Netanyahu Fell Short

When Benjamin Netanyahu failed to secure a 61-seat majority in Israel's March 2021 election, the political math broke down in a way nobody in Jerusalem had ever seen before. For decades, Israeli governments were built by cobbling together Jewish-majority parties while treating Arab lawmakers as permanent outsiders. That unspoken rule died overnight. Suddenly, Mansour Abbas—a soft-spoken dentist from the Galilee leading the Islamist Ra'am party—held the keys to the prime minister's office.

It wasn't supposed to happen like this. Israel held four elections in two years because neither Netanyahu's right-wing bloc nor the anti-Netanyahu camp could cross the 61-seat finish line in the 120-seat Knesset. Every campaign ended in the exact same gridlock. Then Ra'am split from the broader Arab alliance, crossed the 3.25% electoral threshold with four seats, and changed Israeli politics forever. Also making headlines recently: Stop Reading China's Empty Chairs as Weakness When They Are Actually an Operating System Upgrade.

Why the 61-Seat Math Stopped Working for Netanyahu

To understand how Arab parties became kingmakers, you have to look at the personal rivalries tearing apart Israel's political right. On paper, right-wing and religious parties held a clear majority in the 2021 Knesset. If ideology were the only thing that mattered, Netanyahu would've formed a government within a week.

Ideology wasn't the problem. Trust was. Additional information into this topic are covered by The Washington Post.

Former allies like Gideon Sa'ar (New Hope) and Avigdor Liberman (Yisrael Beiteinu) refused to sit under Netanyahu because of his ongoing corruption trials and a long history of broken political promises. Naftali Bennett, leader of the nationalist Yamina party, kept his options open, leaving Netanyahu stuck around 52 to 59 seats depending on how you counted the defectors.

Even with Yamina's seven seats, Netanyahu still came up short. The only path left to 61 ran straight through Mansour Abbas and Ra'am.

The Split That Changed Everything

Before 2021, the four main Arab-majority factions ran together as the Joint List, capturing an impressive 15 seats in March 2020. Yet those 15 seats rarely translated into real power because Zionist parties on both the left and right refused to include them in a governing coalition, and the Joint List itself refused to join one.

Mansour Abbas decided that permanent opposition was a dead end for Arab citizens of Israel, who make up roughly 21% of the country's population. While the rest of the Joint List focused heavily on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and opposed cooperating with right-wing leaders, Abbas took a hyper-pragmatic turn. He broke Ra'am away from the Joint List before the March 2021 vote and campaigned on a simple, blunt premise: we'll work with whoever delivers budgets and safety to our towns.

Most pollsters predicted Ra'am wouldn't even pass the electoral threshold. They were wrong. Ra'am won four seats, while the remaining Joint List dropped to six. Those four seats sat dead-center between Netanyahu's bloc and the opposition bloc led by Yair Lapid.

What Mansour Abbas Actually Demanded

If you only followed headlines from outside the Middle East, you might've assumed Abbas demanded sweeping foreign policy concessions or an immediate peace treaty with the Palestinians. He didn't. Having watched years of political theater achieve nothing for local municipalities, Abbas kept his demands strictly domestic and fiercely practical.

His core conditions centered on everyday survival and basic infrastructure in Arab communities:

  • Crime and policing: Organized crime and gun violence had devastated Arab towns across northern and central Israel, with homicide rates climbing year after year. Abbas demanded serious funding and law enforcement action to dismantle local crime syndicates.
  • Municipal budgets: Chronic underfunding left Arab cities with crumbling roads, overcrowded schools, and fewer public services than neighboring Jewish towns.
  • Housing and zoning: Decades of restrictive planning laws meant thousands of homes in Arab villages were built without permits, leaving families under constant threat of demolition orders. Abbas pushed to freeze demolitions and recognize several unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev desert.
  • Economic development: A multi-year economic plan worth tens of billions of shekels aimed at closing employment, education, and high-tech gaps.

Notice what isn't on that list. There were no demands about Gaza, the West Bank, or Jerusalem's final status. Abbas understood that pushing hot-button national security issues would blow up any coalition deal before the ink dried. By sticking to bread-and-butter civic issues, he made it possible for both Netanyahu and Netanyahu's rivals to seriously negotiate with him.

The Strange Courtship Between Netanyahu and Ra'am

Here's the irony most people forget: Benjamin Netanyahu was the first Israeli leader to actively legitimize Mansour Abbas as a political partner.

Months before the 2021 election, Netanyahu began calling Abbas "Abu Yair" in public appearances and visiting Arab cities to promote COVID-19 vaccinations. Likud strategists realized that peeling Ra'am away from the Joint List would weaken the anti-Netanyahu camp and potentially give Netanyahu a safety net in parliament.

After the election results came in, Netanyahu's emissaries held intense backchannel talks with Ra'am. The plan wasn't for Ra'am to sit inside the cabinet as ministers—that was too hard for Netanyahu's base to swallow. Instead, Likud wanted Ra'am to abstain or vote from the outside to allow a Netanyahu-led government to pass its confidence vote.

There was just one fatal flaw in Netanyahu's plan. His far-right allies in the Religious Zionism party, led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, flatly vetoed any government that relied on Ra'am's support. Smotrich called Ra'am "supporters of terror" and refused to budge, even when Netanyahu's rabbis and advisers leaned on him hard.

Netanyahu had spent years painting Arab lawmakers as existential threats to the state. When he finally needed them to stay in power, the political monster he helped feed wouldn't let him close the deal.

How the Opposition Closed the Deal Instead

While Netanyahu was trapped by his own far-right flank, Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett moved fast. Lapid, leader of the centrist Yesh Atid party, had been tasked with forming a government after Netanyahu's mandate expired in May 2021.

Putting together that coalition looked impossible on paper. Lapid had to unite eight parties spanning the entire political spectrum:

  • Right-wing nationalists (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beiteinu)
  • Centrists (Yesh Atid, Blue and White)
  • Left-wing social democrats (Labor, Meretz)
  • An conservative Islamist party (Ra'am)

They had almost nothing in common except two things: they wanted Netanyahu out of office, and they wanted to pass a state budget after years of paralysis.

On June 2, 2021—less than an hour before Lapid's midnight deadline—Mansour Abbas sat down in a Ramat Gan hotel and signed the coalition agreement. For the first time in Israel's 73-year history, an independent Arab party formally joined a ruling government coalition.

What Happened Once Ra'am Entered the Coalition

Joining the government wasn't a fairy tale for Abbas or his voters. Every single week brought a new crisis.

Inside the Knesset, the coalition held a razor-thin 61-59 majority, meaning a single disgruntled lawmaker could hold the entire government hostage. Meanwhile, the Joint List—especially Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi—attacked Abbas relentlessly from the opposition benches, accusing him of whitewashing Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for municipal budgets.

Netanyahu's Likud party, despite having courted Abbas just weeks earlier, pivoted instantly to attacking the government as dependent on "anti-Zionist" forces. Every security incident, every flare-up at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, and every vote on West Bank regulations threatened to tear the coalition apart.

Yet Ra'am delivered concrete wins before the government collapsed a year later in June 2022:

  1. The 30-billion-shekel five-year plan: Passed as part of the 2021-2022 state budget, allocating roughly $9 billion (at the time) toward infrastructure, education, healthcare, and employment in Arab society.
  2. Negev village recognition: The government approved formal recognition for three previously unrecognized Bedouin villages, allowing them to connect to water and electricity grids.
  3. Anti-crime task forces: Dedicated police units and budget lines were established specifically to combat organized crime and illegal weapons in Arab towns.

Common Misconceptions About Arab Kingmakers in Israel

Because Israeli politics gets filtered through loud partisan media both locally and internationally, a few major myths have stuck around since 2021.

Myth 1: Arab parties had never supported an Israeli government before.
Not true. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin's minority government relied on an outside "blocking bloc" of two Arab-majority parties (Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party) to stay in power and pass the Oslo Accords. What made 2021 historic was that Ra'am actually signed a formal coalition agreement and became an official part of the governing majority, rather than offering external support from the sidelines.

Myth 2: All Arab lawmakers wanted to join the government.
Far from it. Six out of the ten Arab members of the 2021 Knesset—the lawmakers in the Joint List—refused to join Lapid and Bennett's coalition. They argued that joining a government led by right-wing nationalists like Bennett meant sharing responsibility for military operations and settlement expansion.

Myth 3: Mansour Abbas abandoned Palestinian identity.
Abbas repeatedly stated that he remained a proud Palestinian citizen of Israel. His argument was strategic, not ideological: Arab citizens pay taxes, live inside Israel's borders, and need functioning schools and safe streets right now, regardless of how long the broader conflict takes to resolve.

What This Shift Means for Future Israeli Elections

Even though the Bennett-Lapid government fell in 2022 and Netanyahu returned to power later that year with a hard-right 64-seat coalition, the precedent set in 2021 can't be erased.

Israel's demographic and political math hasn't gotten any simpler. Whenever the Zionist parties split evenly between pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu camps, Arab voters hold the tie-breaking vote. Look at what happens to voter turnout in Arab communities:

  • When Arab voters feel their ballots won't translate into real influence, turnout drops below 45%, handing an automatic majority to right-wing blocs.
  • When Arab parties run unified or offer a credible path to real political leverage, turnout climbs past 53% or even 60%, making it nearly impossible for a narrow right-wing coalition to hit 61 seats.

If you're tracking Israeli election cycles or analyzing Middle Eastern coalition politics, stop looking solely at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem polling numbers. Watch three specific indicators instead: whether Arab factions run together or split ahead of the filing deadline, whether turnout in towns like Nazareth, Umm al-Fahm, and Rahat trends above 50%, and whether centrist leaders are willing to commit upfront to coalition partnerships rather than treating Arab lawmakers as an emergency backup plan. Whoever cracks that formula holds the real power in the Knesset.

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Hana Brown

With a background in both technology and communication, Hana Brown excels at explaining complex digital trends to everyday readers.